Government At Odds With SPJ Report p. 11

By: Debra Gersh Hernandez

Treasury Department report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms raid on the Branch Davidian complex in Texas
exonerates newspaper reporter, points finger at TV cameraman sp.

CITING A LACK of "concrete evidence," the Society of Professional Journalists says there is no proof that a television cameraman inadvertently tipped Branch Davidians about a pending raid on their compound near Waco, Texas, in February.
However, a Treasury Department report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms raid, released Sept. 30, found that when KWTX-TV cameraman James Peeler asked mailman David Jones for directions to the compound, he accidentally alerted the Davidians. Jones was a member of the group, and, according to the report, he immediately returned to the compound to alert its leader David Koresh.
Jones was killed in the fire that consumed the compound and its occupants April 19 after a 51-day siege by federal authorities.
SPJ's report on media coverage of the raid exonerated local media in general and Peeler and the Waco Tribune-Herald specifically (E&P, Sept. 11, p. 44).
"We have revisited the issue since the ATF released its report . . . . The station maintains its employee did not tip the cult, and in the absence of further information on the role of the cameraman, the issue is one that remains unresolved," outgoing SPJ president Georgianna Vines said in a statement released at the group's recent annual meeting in Miami.
Vines, assistant managing editor of the Knoxville News-Sentinel, said, "As a result of the ATF conclusion, I asked the co-chairmen of the SPJ task force to take another look at the role of the cameraman. The co-chairmen have gone back to top-level managers at the station, who maintain no one on their staff tipped off the Davidians.
"We find no evidence that contradicts them," she said. "Not all of the key players can be interviewed because some are dead. The ATF report is based on second and third sources, what a court of law would say is hearsay evidence."
However, Ronald K. Noble, assistant secretary (enforcement) at the Treasury Department, who oversaw the ATF investigation and report, recently told a congressional panel, "We now know that Koresh was alerted to the raid based on a warning ? albeit unintentional ? from a television cameraman to one of Koresh's followers."
The Treasury report notes that the SPJ report "simply ignores the conflict between KWTX management's denial to the [SPJ] task force of responsibility for the leak to Koresh and KWTX cameraman Peeler's admission . . . well before the task force report that he had disclosed sensitive facts to a Branch Davidian."
The Treasury report cites a Dallas Morning News article by Lee Hancock quoting Peeler as saying he spoke to a man in a car with Postal Service markings but he did not know that the man was a Davidian.
Agents near the compound also reported seeing Peeler talking to Jones and then watching Jones return to the compound.
In addition, the report says Peeler told government investigators that "he told someone later identified as David Jones that a law enforcement action would soon take place at the compound. It is undisputed that Jones took this information and alerted Koresh."
An undercover ATF agent inside the compound was with Koresh when Jones returned. Jones called Koresh away, telling him that there was an important phone call from England. When Koresh returned, the ATF agent reported, he was visibly shaken.
Initial speculation was that Jones was referring to Tribune-Herald reporter Mark England, co-author of the paper's "Sinful Messiah" series about Koresh, which began the day before the raid.
"This interpretation led to speculation that Mark England alerted Koresh to the impending raid. However, Kor-esh's attorneys have said that Jones told them that he was referring to the country," the Treasury report noted, adding, "There is no evidence that Mark England placed a call to the compound on the morning of February 28."

Not blamed, but blamed

Further, the report very specifically noted, "However tragic the results of his carelessness may have been, Peeler should not be made the scapegoat for the fact that Koresh learned of the raid. Given the extent of other obvious media activity in the area, had Koresh not learned of the raid from Peeler, he might just as easily have been placed on guard by that other activity."
For example, in addition to a number of unmarked media vehicles patrolling the road in front of the compound hours before the raid was to begin, a group of reporters went to a house across from the compound and asked if they could watch the raid from there "without taking any precautions to ensure that these neighbors would not in turn alert Koresh to the impending raid."
The report, however, did say, "Media activity in the vicinity of the compound was not the immediate cause of the casualties suffered by ATF agents on February 28. They were inflicted by Koresh and his followers and could have been avoided had ATF's raid commanders called off the operation once they recognized that they had lost the advantage of surprise.
"But the media's conduct posed a substantial danger not only to the security of ATF's operation but also to the lives of agents and civilians alike.
"While it is not the purpose of this report to suggest what the media might do to minimize such dangers in the future, the media should further examine its conduct near Waco on February 28," the report stated.
At a follow-up hearing on the Treasury report before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government, Noble said he was concerned that the SPJ report had no indication that the media believe that they need to assume responsibility for their actions or to think about ways that their activities might affect an operation.
Despite a statement in the SPJ report that reporters took precautions to prevent alerting the Davidians, the Treasury report found that the precautions were only using unmarked vehicles.

ATF defends itself

Another unofficial story that circulated after the raid was that reporters were tipped by an ATF public affairs official who called to alert them to the pending raid.
The Treasury report dispelled that notion.
ATF public affairs officer Sharon Wheeler called three Dallas television stations for weekend telephone numbers.
According to the report, Wheeler not only avoided contacting Waco media "out of a concern that the raid's security might be threatened," but she gave no information to the Dallas media that could have alerted them to the operation.
"Indeed, none of the stations she contacted were at the compound until well after the firefight began," the report said.
When ATF agents heard about the Tribune-Herald's investigation of the Davidians, they nixed the idea of any contact. However, in mid-January, when Tribune-Herald managing editor Barbara Elmore asked Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Johnston whether the Davidians might retaliate against the newspaper for its series, Johnston told Elmore of ATF concerns about publication and set up a meeting.
At the meeting, according to the report, ATF agents offered "front-row seats" to Tribune-Herald reporters during the action if the newspaper would delay publication until after the raid. Elmore reportedly said any such decision would have to be made by the publisher.
The ATF's acting resident agent in charge from Austin, Earl Dunagan, said he told Elmore that the raid was scheduled Feb. 22 and he would contact her if that changed.
According to the report, Elmore said she remembered being told only that some ATF action might be taken in two to four weeks.
Two weeks after that meeting, Dunagan told Elmore that the raid date had been changed to March 1. She reportedly told him that the newspaper had made no decision about publication of the series, and she told others at the paper about the date change.
The agent "believed the paper was cooperating with ATF's request to hold the story because Elmore had not told him anything to the contrary," according to the report.
"Editors at the Tribune-Herald, on the other hand, have indicated that they felt no obligation to respond to ATF one way or the other; indeed, they report having been surprised that ATF agents did not contact other members of Tribune-Herald management after Elmore had told ATF she could not make the decision to delay publication of the articles," the report stated.
The special agent in charge from Houston, Phillip Chojnacki, subsequently was assigned to be ATF liaison as well as a security consultant to the paper, which was concerned about reprisal from the Davidians after the series was published.
Chojnacki sought advice from ATF's chief of public affairs, Jack Killorin, because approval is required for media "ride alongs."
"Noting Koresh's messiah complex and his paranoia, they agreed that taking the press along on a raid could create an inflammatory situation," according to the report.
"Chojnacki said he would offer Tribune-Herald [reporters] key interviews and would recognize their hard work but would not accept a demand that they be present at the raid or tell them the date or time of the raid. Killorin advised that ATF should not give the Tribune-Herald an exclusive story."
By Feb. 24, the series was ready, and ATF officials met with newspaper executives.
According to the report, editor Robert Lott was determined to go ahead with publication unless there was clear and convincing evidence that it would cause harm.
Chojnacki thanked editors for holding the story, but they quickly informed him that publication was delayed for reasons other than the ATF request.
The agent again implored editors to hold the series so as not to agitate Koresh, but he did not give the paper a sense that the raid was imminent. According to the report, Tribune-Herald editors said Chojnacki said nothing to persuade them to delay publication.
Contrary to speculation, they decided to run the story Feb. 27, a Saturday, not because of the March 1 raid date but for security reasons: They would have time to gauge Koresh's reaction to the series during the weekend, when fewer people were at the newspaper.
Meanwhile, Chojnacki reported to ATF that the newspaper had declined to delay publication, and the raid was rescheduled Feb. 28, the day that agents speculated that the series would begin.
Feb. 26, after giving final approval to begin the series the next day, Tribune-Herald publisher Randall Preddy called Chojnacki and told him that he could get a copy at the paper's loading dock at 12:15 a.m. Feb. 27, the report said.

Defending its moves

"The question remains, however, whether ATF exercised good judgment in initiating contact with the Tri-
bune-Herald," the report pointed out.
"Informed opinion differs on this
point . . . . On balance, though, the review believes that ATF made a reasonable judgment call in deciding to contact the Tribune-Herald.
"The danger that the Tribune-Herald would betray ATF's confidences might well have been outweighed by benefits to the agency if the newspaper's series could have been delayed or, at the very least, if the publication dates were known," the report stated.
"At the time ATF made its decision, the Tribune-Herald already had some knowledge of ATF's investigation and, in any event, ATF always retained the option to cancel or postpone the raid," the report noted.
"Given the resources the Tribune-Herald had committed to this investigation, ATF could hardly have requested the paper's forbearance in general terms. Nor could ATF reasonably ask the Tribune-Herald to withhold publication indefinitely. As a result, discussions between ATF and the paper were unlikely to be successful unless they reached some level of specificity."
In addition, the ATF did not consider who would represent it before the media. Those chosen not only had minimal experience with the press but were preoccupied with planning the raid.
Also, ATF agents had no previous working relationship with the newspaper or its parent company, Cox Enterprises, the report continued, noting that local law enforcement officials could have been helpful in that area.
"ATF agents arrived in Waco and simply asked newspaper representatives to give up something of tremendous value to the paper ? the opportunity to expose a local problem with independent, in-depth coverage," the report explained. "Were the paper to delay its series until after the raid had exposed the compound's activities, the story would lose its exclusivity and profitability.
"In exchange, the agents offered the paper security advice, advice that any law enforcement agency would give freely if asked, and a chance to watch raid training at Fort Hood, an event with minimal news value."
The same day that editors were meeting with Chojnacki, courts reporter Tommy Witherspoon got a tip from a confidential source that something "big" was going to happen at the compound March 1. City editor Brian Blansett decided to send reporters.
It didn't take long for news of the raid to circulate among Waco media, the report noted.
Witherspoon reportedly told KWTX cameraman Dan Mullony that something was planned at the compound, and through an ambulance dispatcher whom he knew, Mullony confirmed that ambulances had been put on standby Feb. 28.
In the interim, Witherspoon's source told him that the raid had been moved to Feb. 28, and the paper assigned nine reporters to the compound area.
KWTX also moved ahead with its coverage plans. The dispatcher had told Mullony that a helicopter medical transport also had been put on standby Feb. 28, indicating a major action was planned.
Although the report says reporters were surprised that they found no roadblocks going into the compound Feb. 28, both the report and Noble's testimony indicate that erecting roadblocks so early ? reporters were on the scene about 7:30 a.m. ? most assuredly would have forewarned the Davidians of the raid.
"They [media] knew the raid was scheduled for 10 a.m.," Noble testified. "It's common sense not to set up the roadblocks too early."
Noble also criticized the media for ignoring safety concerns as they followed agents into the compound. He pointed out that non-ATF figures inside the area would be a distraction.
"Tensions ran high between ATF and the media during the shoot-out and cease-fire," the report explained. "Many agents were angry with media personnel who had been in the midst of the shoot-out, distracting agents while they were under fire and whom agents had almost shot accidentally, fearing they were cult members."
After the raid, commanders provided some misleading and wrong information, setting up a chain of misinformation.
Raid commanders, the report said, "appear to have engaged in a concerted effort to conceal their errors in judgment. And ATF's management, perhaps out of a misplaced desire to protect the agency from criticism, offered accounts based on . . . [the commanders'] statements, disregarding clear evidence that those statements were false."
The report noted, "There may be occasions when pressing operational considerations ? or legal constraints ? prevent law enforcement officials from being less than completely candid in their public utterances. This was not one of them."