National Security Vs. The Public's Right To Know p.12

By: Debra Gersh Hernandez

Congressional committee considers whether the government
should release financial information on intelligence operations sp.

THE DEBATE ABOUT the importance of national security compared with the public's right to know has been going on since this nation's founding, and it continued recently on Capitol Hill.
The issue sparking that discussion was whether Congress should make public the aggregate budget figure for intelligence operations.
During a day and a half of hearings, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence heard arguments ranging from those who said releasing the figure, which some called the worst-kept secret in Washington, is required by the Constitution to others who warned that disclosure could lead to distribution of secret information to enemies of the United States.
Noting that the last hearings on this issue were held 16 years ago, committee chairman Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) said, "It is now difficult to imagine any potential enemy for whom possession of this information would make any measurable difference."
A strong proponent of releasing the information, Glickman said he believes that "the dictates of the Constitution and the policies which govern classification would compel disclosure."
The constitutional argument stems from the section of the document declaring, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 set up the framework followed today, under which the CIA budget is secret and the agency can receive funds from the budgets of other agencies and departments.
"Unless a justification on national security grounds exists, keeping the budget totals secret serves only one purpose, and that is to prevent the American taxpayer from knowing how much money is spent on intelligence," Glickman said.
Glickman further outlined his position in a recent speech to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security (E&P, Feb. 12, p. 14).
On the other side of the issue, "strongly opposed to disclosure," was the committee's ranking Republican, Rep. Larry Combest (R-Texas), who said disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget "would be the first step down a road to disaster for our national security."
Pointing out that President Clinton has expressed his opposition to releasing the number, Combest said, "Providing the total intelligence budget alone is tantamount to misinforming the American people. Without knowledge of any of the principal components of the budget, that number is meaningless to the nonexpert."
Further, Combest said, "Release of the aggregate budget is only the beginning . . . . Once begun, there will be no end to pressure to disclose more and more information on the budget, intentionally and unintentionally, in a frustrated effort to explain how we arrived at the total and why it changed from one year to the next."
Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey also argued against disclosure as did former directors Rich-
ard Helms and Robert Gates. Another
former CIA director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, supported it.
Despite the end of the Cold War, Woolsey noted that there remain "instabilities which could still test our resolve and threaten our interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism . . . .
"What we are debating is the idea that disclosure of the intelligence budget would not harm our efforts to meet challenges and counter threats to our interests," he said. "However, to me, we cannot separate the two; we cannot conduct our mission while engaging in a public debate about the exact size of our budget."
Disclosing the aggregate budget, Woolsey testified, would make it necessary to compete in public against other budget demands.
"We do not shy away from a debate ? in a closed session among the people's elected representatives ? nor do we seek to be exempted from the reductions in the federal budget and work force," he said.
The CIA director explained, "It is virtually impossible to make a persuasive case generally ? without setting out specifics ? in public to fund programs to deal with future uncertainty when competing programs that deal with immediate demands and immediate needs are presented.
"Our ability to mount an effective defense of our budget in public is extremely constrained because of the care we must take in protecting our programs, priorities, sources and methods. If we provide public assessments of our accomplishments as well as threats and the measures we are pro-posing in countering them, we might easily sway the arguments in favor of our budget. But such a budget 'victory' would be hollow, for the disclosure of such information would render ineffective the very systems or programs we are trying to initiate."
Woolsey also pointed out the difficulty of engaging in public budget discussions "without running the danger of revealing sources and methods which, in turn, could damage our relations" with intelligence agencies from "key allies and friends throughout the globe."
While conceding that "there are some things regarding intelligence about which we can and should be more open," Woolsey said, "if we are to have an effective intelligence system, there are a number of aspects that must always be secret.
"In my opinion, we do not need to publicize the intelligence budget in order to demonstrate the right kind of greater openness about the work of the intelligence community," he said.
Woolsey also noted that not only has he worked closely with House and Senate committees but also that all members of Congress may examine and debate the intelligence budget in secret.
"Through your oversight function," he told the committee, "you represent and safeguard the interests of the public by ensuring that intelligence activities are carried out responsibly, effectively and in accordance with the law."
Gates said he was puzzled by the desire to make the suspected number public, calling that action a mistake.
"Once it's confirmed officially, it's almost impossible not to break it down further to defend it," he said, warning against that slippery slope becoming an "intelligence budget luge." Gates outlined four specific dangers he sees in releasing the aggregate number:
? Once publicized, "especially in today's budgetary and political environment," it would be difficult to ever increase the amount.
? Once the number is out, it would be difficult to undertake new initiatives, such as major covert actions or satellite programs, because the increases immediately would draw attention.
? It would begin to break down the process of Congress as the people's surrogate on intelligence matters, which is the principle behind the six intelligence committees.
? The executive branch would look elsewhere to hide funding for sensitive programs, thus complicating congressional oversight duties.
Helms agreed that the Cold War is over but cautioned against release of the budget, saying, "It seems to me we're in a haste not only to have it over but to forget it."
Not only are weapons still sitting on launch pads but the first major terrorist attack inside the United States ? the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York ? occurred after the end of the Cold War, Helms noted.
Turner, who said he testified in 1978 in favor of releasing the single budget figure, said releasing it would lead to more support from the American people "because they know what they're getting" for their tax dollars.
"Intelligence has to stand up to the same scrutiny" as other budget items, Turner added.
Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) testified before the House committee that he found "no national security justification" for not releasing the aggregate budget.
The contention that its release would harm national security is "sheer nonsense," he said. "There is little or no intelligence information that could be gleaned from this figure, even though it does provide a useful indicator of budget priorities to the American people."
Three years ago, Metzenbaum proposed language to the Senate Intelligence Committee "to require, beginning in 1993, disclosure of the total amount requested, authorized and spent for intelligence and intelligence-related activities."
The Senate was forced to settle instead on "sense of Congress" language after President Bush threatened to veto the authorization bill, Metzenbaum said, adding that the same language was adopted again in 1992.
Also in the face of executive branch opposition, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) last year introduced a floor amendment, but it was dropped after an agreement could not be reached in conference, Metzenbaum reminded the committee.
Calling Woolsey's reasoning "strange arguments, indeed," Metzenbaum said, "To begin with, the argument that 'if the American people knew how much we spent, they would tell us to stop' is hardly a sufficient justification for official secrecy.
"If the American people would not stand for such expenditures, then should we not listen to the voters who sent us here?"
Further, he said, "The concern over possible disclosures, at least as I have heard it from Director Woolsey himself, is stranger yet. For would he keep the budget figure secret in order to avoid pressures on himself to release more information. Does he mean that he would be unable to resist those pressures? If so, then perhaps he is not the best person for the job of director of central intelligence."
Metzenbaum said he hopes "that the administration will see the light sooner rather than later and simply disclose the intelligence budget total. If it does not, however, then both houses of Congress must summon the courage to require this modest and sensible disclosure."
Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) testified that because members can review the intelligence budget, nothing is being kept from the American people.
"I do trust the American people but not all the American people," he said, listing a number of notorious spies, including the recently arrested alleged Soviet mole in the CIA. "The list is quite long of people I do not trust."
While the Cold War may be over, other hot wars still are going on, Hyde said, adding, "While the bear is asleep, the forest is full of snakes."
Hyde also took the position that the "aggregate total is useless unless you know the cost-benefit ratio."
Disclosure of the total is only the first step, he said.
"Once you start down that road, you might as well have visitor's day at the CIA and let them look over the shoulders of the analysts."
Frank, who also testified before the committee, argued, "When people say this is the first step, [what they're saying is] they don't like the first step. They don't like the policy but they're not going to argue against it."
In addition, various functions performed by intelligence agencies, such as economic and environmental analysis are "not of the same order as national security," Frank noted.
The Massachusetts congressman also noted that it is possible to avoid releasing data beyond the aggregate budget.
"The best way to not ask a question is to move no part of your mouth," he said. "Knowing the aggregate number is relevant to the overall allocation debate as an indication of its overall importance."
The subcommittee also heard from legal experts and scholars about the historical and constitutional aspects of the proposal.